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Abstract 
Do economic downturns encourage racist attitudes? Does this in-turn lead to worse labour 
market outcomes for minorities? We assess these important questions using British attitude 
and labour force data. The attitude data show that racial prejudice is countercyclical, with the 
effect driven by large increases for high-skilled middle-aged working men – a 1%-point 
increase in unemployment is estimated to increase self-reported racial prejudice by 4%-
points. Correspondingly, the labour force data show that racial employment and wage gaps 
are counter-cyclical, with the largest effects also observed for high-skilled men, especially in 
the manufacturing and construction industries – a 1%-point increase in unemployment is 
estimated to increase the wage gap by 3%. These results are entirely consistent with the 
theoretical literature, which proposes that racial prejudice and discrimination are the result of 
labour market competition among individuals with similar traits, and that the effects of this 
competition are exacerbated during periods of economic downturn. 
Keywords:  Prejudice; Recessions; Racism; Discrimination.  
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”To make matters worse, the current economic and social crises threaten to widen some 
equality gaps that might have closed in better times.” (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, 2010) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent commentary in the popular press and corresponding statements from equality and 
human rights groups propose that racial prejudice has escalated during the recent Great 
Recession.1 If true, this rise in racial prejudice may have led to increased labour market 
discrimination, widening already existing inequalities in wages and employment. This is in 
line with predictions from a theoretical literature that highlights the propensity for prejudice 
and discrimination to increase during periods of economic downturn, due to increased 
competition for scarce resources (Levine and Campbell, 1972; Frijters, 1998; Smith, 2012; 
Caselli and Coleman, 2013). In view of the strong public interest in this issue and the 
important repercussions for policy-makers, this paper provides a detailed analysis of whether 
self-reported racial prejudice and racial labour market gaps are counter-cyclical.  
 
Our measure of racial prejudice is found in British Social Attitudes Surveys between 1983 
and 2010, and is a declaration by a White respondent of being ‘not prejudiced at all’, ‘a little 
prejudiced’, or ‘very prejudiced’ against people of other races. To identify the effects of 
macroeconomic conditions we exploit variation across geographic regions and time; a general 
econometric approach that has been used to analyse attitudes towards immigrants (Mayda, 
2006), attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Dustmann and Preston, 2001) and racially 
motivated crime (Falk et al., 2011). Our findings suggest that prejudice amongst native-born 
Whites increases with the unemployment rate, with the effect owed mainly to large increases 
among highly-educated, middle-aged, full-time employed men. For example, it is estimated 
for this subgroup that a 1%-point increase in the unemployment rate increases self-reported 
prejudice by approximately 4%-points.  
 
This increase in prejudice may translate into worse labour market outcomes for non-Whites 
through two main mechanisms. First, increased discrimination could affect non-Whites at all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Examples from the popular press include: The Telegraph, 19 January 2009; Reuters, September 1 2008; The 
Times 14 January 2009; The New York Times 12 September 12 2009. 
	   4	  
levels within firms if there is a general increase in taste-based discrimination2, or second, it 
could be concentrated among the highly skilled if the propensity to discriminate arises from 
increased competition among employees with similar positions. First, assuming that highly-
educated middle-aged White men are more likely to be managers and employers, and have 
political power within organisations, as racial prejudice increases among this group, high-
skilled White managers may discriminate against people of all skill levels for whom they 
have hierarchical power over.  Second, it is possible that prejudice and subsequent 
discrimination arise from increased competition between White and non-White job seekers 
and workers with similar traits. By forming coalitions based on ethnicity, individuals are 
more likely to hire and promote persons from within their own coalition in an attempt to 
capture labour market rents. This second mechanism implies that the negative effects will be 
concentrated mainly among high-skilled non-Whites.	  Overall, we expect that counter-cyclical 
racial prejudice will cause counter-cyclical labour market discrimination.  We can explore 
this hypothesis, and comment on the most likely mechanism, using data on native-born 
individuals from the 1993-2012 versions of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), and 
by including in wage and employment models the interaction between local-level 
unemployment rates and ethnicity. Focusing on native born individuals only, means we avoid 
composition issues that arise due to the varying inflows and outflows of immigrants across 
regions and time. Overall, this approach tests whether racial labour market gaps widen during 
periods of high unemployment under the assumption that differences in unobserved human 
capital between native Whites and native non-Whites are uncorrelated with shocks in area-
level unemployment.  
 
The results suggest that non-Whites are worse off during recessionary periods in terms of 
employment and earned income. We refer to the increased racial wage gaps during periods of 
high unemployment as the ‘recession wage penalty’ (RWP), and correspondingly refer to the 
increased racial employment gaps as the ‘recession employment penalty’ (REP). A 
particularly interesting finding is that the penalties are largest for high-skilled workers, 
supporting the theoretical predictions. Further disaggregation by ethnicity reveals that Black 
workers are the most affected. For example, the Black-White wage gap for high-skilled non-
manual workers is estimated to increase by 2.4% for every 1%-point increase in 
unemployment.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In	  the	  vein	  of	  Becker	  (1957).	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For decades economists have developed theories of racial prejudice (Lang and Lehman, 
2012; Altonji and Blank, 1999; Arrow, 1998; Becker, 1957) and have empirically examined 
its economic consequences (Guryan and Kofi Charles, 2013; Lang and Lehmann, 2012; Fryer 
and Torelli, 2010; Ritter and Taylor, 2011; Lang and Manove, 2011; Dawkins et al, 2005; 
Lang et al, 2005; Chay, 1998; Card and Krueger, 1992; Donohue and Heckman, 1991). There 
are also large independent literatures investigating the determinants of social attitudes, 
including attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy (Quillian’s, 1995; Dustmann 
and Preston, 2005; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Pettigrew 1998; Mayda 2006; Hainmueller 
and Hiscox 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009). However, despite these influential literatures 
there is little economic research on the determinants of self-reported racial prejudice. 
Understanding the economic determinants of prejudicial attitudes is therefore academically 
valuable, as is exploring how racial prejudice may translate into worse labour market 
outcomes for non-Whites.  
 
Our findings also have implications for policies targeting ethnic minorities residing in 
Britain. This arises because of already existing inequalities: minorities live in worse housing 
(Phillips and Harrison; 2010), are taught by lower quality teachers (Clotfelter et al; 2004) and 
are in worse health (Lordan and Johnston, 2011and Bollini and Harold, 1995). Additionally, 
the unemployment rate of minorities in Britain has been approximately double that of Whites 
over the last 40 years, with only half of this gap explained by residential segregation, 
education differences and other observable factors (Leslie et al, 2001; Blackaby et al, 2002 
and Heath and Li, 2007). Higher levels of racial prejudice widen this gap, and thus the recent 
recession may have reversed some of the gains made during the past decades (Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, 2010).   
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we provide a background 
for our study by discussing theoretical and empirical work related to prejudicial attitudes and 
discrimination. In Section 3 we describe the British Social Attitudes data, along with our 
methodology. We also document the results for the empirical work on attitudes. In section 4 
we describe the data sources used to consider labour market impacts, methodology and 
results. The final section is a discussion.  
 
2. Racial Prejudice and Discrimination 
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For many years economists have been interested in a diverse range of individual attitudes and 
values (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; O’ Rourke and Sinnott, 
2001). However, to our knowledge economists have never empirically examined the 
macroeconomic determinants of self-reported racial prejudice.3 This is puzzling, because 
many economic studies examine attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy 
(Quillian’s, 1995; Dustmann and Preston, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Pettigrew 
1998; Mayda 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009). Particularly 
relevant studies include Lahav (2004), who finds that immigration attitudes are related to 
perceptions of economic conditions, Kesslar and Freeman (2005), who find that as economic 
conditions worsen so does public opinion towards migrants, and Dustmann and Preston 
(2007), who demonstrate that racial prejudice and anti-immigration attitudes are strongly 
related in the UK. 
   
The dearth of economic studies is also puzzling given the evidence that prejudicial attitudes 
shape the life chances of ethnic minorities. For example, racial prejudice has been suggested 
as an important causal factor in determining policies that target minorities (Bobo, 1991; 
Sears, 1988). Additionally, lower levels of racial prejudice have been directly linked to 
support for the Welfare State in Britain (Ford, 2006). Elsewhere, Dustmann and Preston, 
(2007) find that racial concerns are an important pathway through which public opinion 
towards immigration policies are formed. Prejudice and subsequent discriminatory practices 
have also been linked to residential segregation (Charles, 2000 and Zubrinsky and Bobo, 
1996), poor health (Johnston and Lordan, 2012 and Lauderale, 2006) and worse labour 
market outcomes (Charles and Guryan, 2008 and Goldsmith et al, 2006). Therefore, shifts in 
racial prejudice during recessionary periods could worsen already existing racial inequalities 
in a number of domains.   
 
While no economic study investigates the macroeconomic determinants of self-reported 
racial prejudice, there are several related economic literatures. For instance a number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Some work outside economics does examine the determinants of self-reported racial prejudice using the 
British Social Attitudes Survey. However, this work focuses on the correlations between individual and 
household characteristics and prejudicial attitudes (Evans 2002; Rothon and Heath 2003; Ford 2008). For 
example, Ford (2008) reports low levels of self-reported prejudice amongst the highly educated, the professional 
classes and women. There is also a related economic literature that examines how the ethnic composition of 
geographical areas influences self-reported prejudice (e.g. Dustmann and Preston, 2001).	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papers examine the macroeconomic determinants of racially-motivated crime. The closest 
example to our study is Falk et al. (2011), who find a significantly positive relationship 
between regional unemployment and the incidence of right-wing extremist crime in 
Germany. The authors hypothesise that the fear of losing a job increases with unemployment, 
and that this fear lowers tolerance and altruism. Another close example is Antecol and Cobb-
Clark (2010), who in contrast find little evidence that racial hostility towards off-base Army 
personnel is related to local economic vulnerability (measured by the unemployment rate, 
poverty rate, and income inequality). This finding of weak relationships with macroeconomic 
conditions is common in the racially-motivated crime literature. For example, 
macroeconomic conditions are found to be only weakly related to the incidence of anti-
foreigner crime in Germany (Krueger and Pischke, 1997), hate crimes in New York (Green et 
al. 1998), race riots in the US (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998), and racial harassment in 
Britain (Dustmann et al., 2011). How relevant these results are for our study is unclear, as 
physical violence is a particular and extreme manifestation of racial prejudice.  
 
Another related literature theoretically models racial discrimination, scarcity and conflict. For 
example, Frijters (1998) argues that job uncertainty and scarcity encourages groups of 
individuals to form coalitions based on observed recognizable characteristics, such as 
ethnicity. Individuals then hire persons from within their own coalition in an attempt to 
capture all the scarce jobs and ensure future labour market success. Smith (2012) builds on 
the social identity literature, which finds that people favour members of their own group at 
the expense of members of other groups, even if securing this outcome creates economic 
inefficiencies. He finds that the competition for scarce resources can induce agents without 
discriminatory attitudes to aggressively discriminate. Finally, Caselli and Coleman (2013) 
consider ethnic conflict. In their model, ethnicity provides a means for group membership 
and exclusion, which limits the ability of the losing groups to access the spoils of conflict, 
such as land titles or government jobs. More generally, there are large literatures in sociology 
and anthropology based on the theory that discrimination is the result of competition over 
scarce resources, the effects of which are exacerbated during periods of economic downturn 
(see Green et al. 1998).  
 
A final related literature considers how the business cycle affects racial wage gaps. Early 
studies relied on aggregate time series data and examined the ratio of annual earnings for the 
discriminated group compared to the majority group (Ashenfelter, 1970; Freeman, 1973; 
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O’Neill, 1985).  None of these studies found empirical evidence of pro- or counter-cyclical 
‘pure’ wage discrimination. Biddle and Hammermesh (2013) provide the most relevant 
contribution by considering wage discrimination over the business cycle in the US using the 
Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1979 through 2009. 
They find evidence that there is a counter-cyclical wage gap for African-Americans, but that 
this is mostly owed to composition effects. They also find an opposite pro-cyclical wage gap 
for Hispanics, but the effect is only marginally significant. There is also a notable 
contribution in the immigration literature by Dustmann et al. (2010). The study compares 
natives and immigrants from OECD and non-OECD countries in Germany and the UK, and 
highlights counter-cyclical unemployment effects for immigrants that are particularly 
pronounced for those from non-OECD countries. 
 
Based on this empirical and theoretical research, we hypothesis that macroeconomic 
conditions can alter an individual’s prejudicial attitudes. In particular, we envisage that each 
individual has a baseline level of prejudice that is affected by the degree to which they are 
experiencing ‘hard economic times’ and have to compete over scarce resources. In 
recessions, when lay-offs and wage cuts are more common, we expect individuals become 
less tolerant towards people of other ethnicities. This is in line with the Caselli and Coleman 
(2013) theoretical model, whereby ethnicity provides a means for group membership and 
exclusion. It is not necessary to make an assumption as to whether steady state baseline 
prejudice levels are high (becoming low when an individual experiences good economic 
fortune) or low (becoming high when an individual experiences bad economic fortune). In 
this work we are simply interested in examining whether racial prejudice is more prevalent in 
the community during periods of high unemployment.   
  
We also hypothesise that different sub-groups of society alter their attitudes in differing 
degrees as unemployment rises. This fits with the aforementioned work and the findings of 
Mayda (2006), who finds that anti-immigration attitudes heighten when an individual’s own 
circumstances are most threatened by immigration. It also fits with our hypothesis that 
tolerance is a function of one’s own individual circumstances. Thus, those who are 
experiencing good economic times prior to the recession are likely to become relativity more 
intolerant towards ethnic minorities, particularly if they are competing alongside these groups 
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in a work environment for income and employment opportunities. 4  Thus, high-skilled 
individuals would become more prejudiced if ethnic minorities were also high-skilled. In the 
UK, native ethnic minorities have spent more years overall in school and possess a higher 
number of degree qualifications than native Whites (Blackaby et al, 2002; Gillborn and 
Gipps, 1996 and Modood et al, 1997).  Additionally, Dustmann and Fabbri (2006) highlight 
that in the UK immigrants have higher levels of skill and education than immigrants in other 
developed countries. Their work also indicates that the immigration attitudes of the educated 
are most influenced by economic factors.  
 
To further investigate these educational attainment differences, we use data from the Labour 
Force Survey (years 1993 to 2012), which we subsequently describe. Multinomial logit 
models are used to model the relationship between an individual’s highest educational 
attainment (third level degree or equivalent; higher education5; A level or equivalent; O level 
grade a-c or equivalent6; other or no qualification7) and race, age, gender, year, and region of 
residence. The marginal effect estimates indicate that native non-Whites have a significantly 
higher probability of attaining a third level degree (1.6%-points) and A-level (0.9%-points), 
but a significantly lower probability of attaining an O-level grade a-c (2.5%-points). Effects 
were statistically insignificant for the remaining categories. Overall, these estimates concur 
with the aforementioned literature, which concludes that native non-Whites in the UK have a 
higher number of qualifications than native Whites. 
 
3. Estimating Racial Prejudice over the Business Cycle 
 
3.1. Data 
Our data is drawn from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey, which is a mostly annual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The unemployed are unlikely to exhibit the highest responsiveness to business cycle fluctuations, as they are 
constantly in labour market competition with other White and non-White job-seekers, regardless of the 
prevailing unemployment rate. Though this competition is more intense when the unemployment rate is high, 
the change in intensity with the unemployment rate is likely less than that which is experienced by the 
employed. Unfortunately, our sample size in the BSA is not sufficient to identify the effect of business cycle 
fluctuations using unemployed persons only, and so we can not test this hypothesis directly. 5	  Tertiary education with a non-degree qualification.	  
6 In the context of this data, those who have O and A levels stay in secondary education until the ages of 16 and 
18, respectively. Students awarded grade A, B, or C in the current system reached the standard of the former 
subject pass at Ordinary Level. This system changed in 1975. So, for our sample all grade D’s indicate a lower 
standard of attainment 7	  Includes international non degree qualifications that are not equivalent to O level grades a-c or A-levels in the 
UK	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series initiated in 1983. The exceptions are 1992 and 1998 when the BSA was not conducted. 
Each year the BSA Survey asks over 3,000 people questions that gauge their social, political 
and moral attitudes. Participants are selected using random probability sampling which 
ensures that the survey is representative of the British population. We focus on the responses 
for White respondents who are in the working-age population (aged 18-64), given our focus 
on the potential role of labour market competition in generating prejudicial attitudes. 
 
The key racial prejudice question was included in all survey years apart from 1993, 1995 and 
1997, and states:  
 
“How would you describe yourself? (1) not prejudiced at all, (2) a little prejudiced, or (3) 
very prejudiced, against people of other races?”.  
 
The relative frequencies of responses (1), (2) and (3) are 67.2%, 30.0% and 2.8%, 
respectively. Given the low frequencies associated with response (3), we aggregate the 
responses “a little prejudiced” and “very prejudiced” to create a binary outcome variable 
measuring any prejudice. Figure 1 presents mean levels of this measure by some key 
demographics. 8  These graphs demonstrate three interesting features. First, the highly 
educated report less prejudice. This is consistent with the highly educated being more tolerant 
(Sullivan and Transue, 1999 and Hello et al, 2006). Second, those not working report less 
prejudice than those who are working (or equal in the case of highly educated females). Note 
that the non-working group consists predominantly of home-makers, with the unemployed a 
relative minority. Third, males report more prejudice than females. This is consistent with 
Lubbers et al (2002), and Johnson and Marini (1998). Combined, these relationships imply 
that low-educated working males are the most prejudiced (42%) and high-educated non-
working women are the least prejudiced (23%). 
 
It is likely that self-reported prejudice is a biased measure of true prejudice due to people 
voicing a different attitude publicly (to the interviewer) than they hold privately. That is, self-
reported prejudicial attitudes are likely under-reported (Rudman et al, 2001). However, Evans 
(2002) highlights that the self-reported prejudice variable in the BSA is correlated closely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In Figure 1 those who have achieved a CSE, O level or GCSE are described as having medium education, and 
those with an A-level or degree are described as highly educated. All others are described as possessing low 
levels of education.  
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with other indicators of racial intolerance, and we expect those with the highest level of 
prejudice to declare. Additionally, the tendency to under-report owing to social desirability is 
unlikely to be associated with the prevailing unemployment rate, unless the unemployment 
rate has a strongly significant effect on the level of prejudicial attitudes within the general 
community. We do note that it is possible that during recessions some media outlets and 
political groups increasingly discuss ethnic minorities in a critical manner. Subsequently, 
individuals may be more likely to declare their pre-existing prejudice as they deem such 
views as more socially acceptable.9 Here we argue that this still represents a change in levels 
of racial tolerance, given that being willing to declare one’s prejudice also implies an 
increased probability of acting upon it. Finally, the tendency to under-report should bias the 
estimated relationship between unemployment rates and attitudes downwards (towards zero). 
 
Another potential issue is that responses to the racial prejudice question may be influenced by 
individuals’ views of immigrants and immigration policy (and vice-versa), implying that the 
estimated influence of economic downturns on racial prejudice may be confounded by the 
influence of economic downturns on attitudes towards immigration. Unfortunately, it isn’t 
possible to separately estimate the influence of economic downturns on racial prejudice and 
immigration attitudes because the BSA does not include a consistently-worded question on 
immigration attitudes across time. We can however examine the association between these 
two attitudes for a subset of years (1983, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1994 and 1996). In these 
years, BSA respondents were asked: “Britain controls the numbers of people from abroad 
that are allowed to settle in this country. Please say for each of the groups below, whether 
you think Britain should allow more settlement, less settlement, or about the same amount as 
now.” First, the correlations between our racial prejudice variable and variables representing 
less settlement by ‘Australians and New Zealanders’, ‘Indians and Pakistanis’, ‘West Indians’ 
and ‘People from Eastern Europe’ equal 0.08, 0.30, 0.27 and 0.14, respectively. Second, in a 
regression model the proportion of variation in racial prejudice explained by the four 
immigration variables is around 8%. Third, only the anti-immigration attitudes towards 
Indians and Pakistanis (t-stat = 14.3) and West Indians (t-stat = 6.0) were statistically 
significant positive predictors of racial prejudice. This set of results indicate that anti-
immigration attitudes are only weakly related to racial prejudice and that the existing weak 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Evidence of this occurring is given by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) who highlight that media exposure 
influences attitudes towards whether the 9/11 terrorist attacks were justified.	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relationship is driven almost entirely by attitudes towards non-White immigrants. Therefore, 
our results will more strongly reflect negative attitudes towards non-Whites than attitudes 
towards immigrants or immigration policy. 
 
Overall the data comprises 23 survey years, and eleven areas within the UK. These areas are: 
North East England, North West England, Yorkshire and Humber, East Midlands, West 
Midlands, South West England, East of England, London, South East England, Wales and 
Scotland. Official unemployment rate data is only available for these areas from 1992, and so 
to construct area-level unemployment rates for 1983-1991 we use area-level information on 
the numbers of claimants for Job Seekers Allowance (JSA). The difficulty is that claimant 
rates are not necessarily equivalent to unemployment rates, because some of the unemployed 
are ineligible for or may not claim unemployment benefits. To control for this difference, we 
construct area-level unemployment rates by multiplying the area-level claimant rate with the 
ratio of national unemployment rates to national claimant rates.  That is, for the period 1983-
1991 the unemployment rate used in this work is derived as 𝑐𝑟!"# ∙ 𝑢𝑟!" 𝑐𝑟!", where 𝑐𝑟!"# is 
the area-level claimant rate, and 𝑢𝑟!" and 𝑐𝑟!" are the national unemployment and claimant 
rates, respectively.10  
 
Figure 2 presents the national self-reported racial prejudice series across time. It shows a 
general downward trend across the 1980s and 1990s, followed by an upward trend in the 
2000s. The upward trend may have been partly caused by the world-wide increase in 
terrorism during this period. Another interesting feature is the sharp uptake in the early 
1990s. This corresponds with a period of high unemployment in Britain; the national 
unemployment rate peaked at 10.8% in early 1993. Figure 3 presents the estimated cross-
sectional relationship between self-reported racial prejudice and unemployment using 
between area variation (an Epanechnikov kernel function and a rule-of-thumb bandwidth are 
used). The non-parametric estimates are presented for three labour market groups: employed, 
unemployed and all others, which are primarily home-makers. The figure shows a strong 
positive relationship between racial prejudice and unemployment for workers across all UR 
values. There is also a positive relationship for the unemployed, but this exists only up until 
an UR of 8%. The relationship is weak for the ‘all others’ group. This is in line with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This approach follows advice received from the Office of National Statistics. It assumes that there is no 
difference between the divergence of claimant and unemployment rates across areas 
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hypothesis that those who are in competition with ethnic minorities for jobs are more likely to 
change their levels of prejudice with rising unemployment. Though it is difficult to draw any 
firm conclusions from cross-sectional correlations, this figure suggests it may be important to 
consider heterogeneity in the underlying relationship.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
To model the effects of macroeconomic conditions on the racial prejudice of White 
respondents, we use a linear regression model with area-specific intercepts and area-specific 
linear time trends:   
 𝑅𝑃!"# = 𝛿𝑈𝑅!" + 𝑋!"#𝛽′+ 𝜇! + 𝛼!! + 𝛼!!𝑡 + 𝜀!"#     (1)  
 
where 𝑅𝑃!"# is the self-reported racial prejudice of individual i residing in area a in year t, 𝑈𝑅!" is the area-year-level unemployment rate, 𝑋!"#is a vector of individual-level control 
variables, 𝜇! is a year fixed-effect, 𝛼!! is an area-specific intercept, 𝛼!!𝑡 is an area-specific 
time-trend, and 𝜀!"# is the usual random disturbance term. Standard errors are clustered at the 
area-year level (229 clusters).11  
 
Area-level intercepts (fixed-effects) are included in equation (1) as it is likely that racial 
prejudice is influenced by local factors. Area-specific linear time trends are also included 
because it is plausible that there has been a trend across time towards the acceptance of other 
ethnicities, and that the slope of this trend differs by area. More generally, area-specific 
trends capture time-variant unobservable factors that are associated with both prejudice and 
unemployment. Given the inclusion of area-level intercepts and area-specific time trends, the 
effect of the unemployment rate on prejudice is identified by within-area variation in 
unemployment in relation to within-area variation in prejudice around its trend.12  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 We’ve chosen this level because the low number of unbalanced clusters at the area-level (11) and year-level 
(21) may introduce a downwards-biased cluster-robust variance matrix estimate (Bertrand et al., 2004). In our 
models, the standard errors clustered at the area-year-level are generally larger than the standard errors obtained 
when clustered at the area- or year-level. 
12 We have also estimated models with area-specific covariates that control for the effects that the September 11 
2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent events may have had on racial prejudice. These covariates amount to the 
addition of the term 𝛼!! ∙ Ι 𝑦 > 2001  to equation (1), where Ι ∙  is an indicator function that equals one if the 
argument is true and zero otherwise. 
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The vector of individual-level control variables (𝑋!"!) includes, gender, age, age-squared, 
number of children, marital status (married, separated/divorced/widowed or single), 
employment status (full-time employed, part-time employed, unemployed, retired, full time 
student, with all others (mostly home-makers) as the control group), log of household income 
and log of household income squared (in 2010 prices). To the extent that voting preference 
can capture some propensity of an individual to be more or less liberal (Pallage and 
Zimmermann, 2006), or indeed their personality in general (Schoen and Schumann, 2007 and 
Caprara et al, 1999), we include dummies indicating if a person either has no party allegiance 
or votes for: Labour, Alliance, or ‘other party’ (Conservative is thus the reference group). 
Appendix Table A1 reports the sample means of these variables by ‘not prejudiced’ and 
‘prejudiced’.   
 
Particularly important covariates are the education variables, which are used to define 
estimation subgroups. Those with A-levels or a university degree are described as highly 
educated. In the UK, students completing A-levels stay in school until roughly 18 years and 
generally aim for third level education. Those who have achieved a certificate of secondary 
education (CSE), O-levels or a general certificate of secondary education (GCSE) are 
described as having medium education (CSE and O-levels were replaced by the GCSE in 
1988). All three qualifications represent a low-level secondary school qualification that is 
usually achieved when the student is aged 15. Individuals without any qualification are 
described as possessing low levels of education. This classification approach generates three 
education groups of roughly equivalent sample size. Importantly, education information is 
missing from the BSA Survey in years 1983 and 1984, and therefore the regression sample 
begins in 1985. 
 
3.3. Results 
Table 1 presents coefficient estimates for equation (1), separately by males and females. The 
coefficient on the unemployment rate equals 0.010 for males and 0.004 for females. These 
values imply that the probability of self-reported prejudice increases for males and females 
by 1.0%-points and 0.4%-points when the UR increases by 1%-point; however, neither 
coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10% level. We draw similar conclusions if 
we do not collapse our self-reported prejudice measure (not prejudiced at all, a little 
prejudiced, very prejudiced) into a binary indicator and instead use an ordered probit model 
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(estimated coefficients for males and females are statistically insignificant with t-statistics 
equal to 1.58 and 0.49). 13 
 
The control variables coefficients in Table 1 highlight that male full-time workers, and 
female full-time and part-time workers are more likely to be racially prejudiced than the 
control group.14 Relative to those with low education, the highly educated are less likely to 
report racial prejudice, and the medium educated are more likely to report racial prejudice. 
For income our results imply that middle-income households are most likely to be racially 
prejudiced. This is evidenced by the inverse-U relationship between income and prejudice. 
Intuitively, voting preference is also indicative of prejudicial attitudes. Table 1 reveals that 
Labour and Alliance voters report being less racially prejudiced than conservative voters 
regardless of gender. This is also the case for those who report having no political 
allegiance.15  
 
As discussed in Section 2, we are interested in how the prejudicial attitudes of different sub-
groups change with the business cycle. In particular, we hypothesise that the counter-cyclical 
relationship will be strongest for high-skilled workers (e.g. more experienced and better 
educated). Ethnic minorities who are native to Britain have higher education than White 
natives, and therefore in periods of economic downturn the labour market competition 
between ethnic minorities and Whites will be most intense for high-skilled workers. Note that 
this dynamic is relatively unique to the UK. For example, in the United States both native and 
immigrant ethnic minorities are lower skilled than Whites. In this context, studies have 
concluded that fears about the adverse effects of labour-market competition are the cause of 
anti-immigration attitudes among low-skilled, blue collar workers (Scheve and Slaughter, 
2001; Mayda, 2006).  
 
In Table 2 we present estimated UR coefficients separately by age (18-34, 35-64), education 
level (low, medium, high) and employment status (full-time, full-time or part-time, not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Including area-specific controls for the sharp increase in racial prejudice post September 11 2001 does not 
alter these results or any other results presented in the paper. 
14 This gender difference is perhaps owed to it being more common in the UK for females to be part-time 
employed than in other countries and in comparison to males (Manning  and Petrongolo, 2008)  
15 It is possible that political allegiance may be driven by prejudicial attitudes and as such this set of variables 
may be endogenous. Omitting them from the regression models, however, has very little impact on the 
remaining estimated coefficients. 
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employed). Considering age, the only statistically significant effect is for males aged 35-64. 
For this group, the estimate of 0.017 implies racial prejudice increases by 1.7%-points for 
every 1%-point increase in UR. Or to put it another way, for a 4%-point increase in UR (as 
seen in the most recent recessionary period) it is estimated that 7 additional men out of every 
100 self-report racial prejudice. The sub-analysis by education reveals that racial prejudice is 
indeed most strongly counter-cyclical for the high education group. The estimated effects for 
males and females equal 0.015 and 0.015. With respect to employment status, Table 2 reveals 
that prejudice attitudes are counter-cyclical for working males. If we consider full-time 
working males, the results imply that a 1%-point increase in UR increases racial prejudice by 
1.8%-points.16 
 
To explore this finding further, the bottom panel of Table 2 presents additional sub-group 
analysis based on interactions between age, education and employment. The results show that 
for men the UR effect is large and statistically significant for each interacted sub-group. The 
effect is particular large in the final row, which presents estimates for the highly educated 
that are full-time employed and aged 35-64. The estimate suggests that a 1%-point increase in 
UR increases racial prejudice by 3.9%-points. This is a 11% increase relative to the mean 
racial prejudice for this group of 36%. For females, racial prejudice is also most strongly 
counter-cyclical for the highly educated that are full-time employed and aged 35-64. The 
estimate suggests that a 1%-point increase in UR increases racial prejudice by 2.2%-points. 
Given that the average individual in this sub-group is relatively high-skilled, these findings 
concur with our hypothesis that racial prejudice is most strongly counter-cyclical for high-
skilled workers.17 
 
Importantly, an alternative explanation is possible for the results presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
Prejudice levels amongst workers may increase during recessions if individuals with 
relatively low levels of racial prejudice are more likely to become unemployed than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Interestingly, the estimated effects of unemployment on prejudice are substantially larger during the recent 
Great Recession. Using the period 2005-2010, the estimated unemployment rate effects for employed men and 
for highly-educated men equal 0.050 (t-stat = 2.53) and 0.059 (t-stat = 2.71), respectively. 
17 It’s possible that the most relevant measure of labour market competition is not the area-year unemployment 
rate (as used in Tables 1 and 2), but more individual-specific rates (e.g. based on area, year, education and age). 
However, it is not possible to use individual-specific rates in the BSA analyses as the areas and survey years in 
the British Labour Force Survey only partially match those in the BSA. Nevertheless, we can demonstrate that 
the area-year UR is a significant predictor of employment outcomes for all subgroups and is therefore relevant 
(results available upon request). 
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individuals with high levels of racial prejudice. This systematic selection out of employment 
is plausible if prejudiced workers cooperate together and compete against more tolerant 
individuals for scarce resources. In this scenario, individual-level prejudice may not have 
increased during recessions; however, it is still the case that the likelihood of encountering a 
prejudiced colleague, manager or employer has increased. Thus, we still view this as a 
worrisome change. 
 
The results in Tables 1 and 2 are also robust to alternative model specifications (see 
Appendix Table A2). First, the continuous UR was replaced with dummies representing the 
UR groupings of 5-8%, 8-11% and >11% (<5% was the omitted comparison group). The 
estimated effects for the high-skilled subgroup (i.e. highly educated, full-time employed and 
aged 35-64) equal 0.031, 0.080 and 0.169. Second, lagged UR variables (𝑈𝑅!"!!, 𝑈𝑅!"!!) 
were added to the specification. The dynamic specifications suggest that the UR effect is 
largely contemporaneous. For the high-skilled subgroup the estimated effects for 𝑈𝑅!" , 𝑈𝑅!"!! and 𝑈𝑅!"!! equal 0.040, -0.004 and 0.006, respectively. Finally, using a three year 
average of UR, which would reduce any measurement error, counter-intuitively reduces the 
estimated UR effect for some sub-groups; however, the effect for the high-skilled subgroup 
remains strong (0.043). 
 
Finally, we can show that the unemployment rate relates to the BSA respondents’ 
expectations of future prejudice rates in Britain. In addition to the question on own racial 
prejudice, the BSA regularly asks “Do you think there is generally more racial prejudice in 
Britain now than there was 5 years ago?” with the respondent given the following response 
options:  “less”, “more” or “about the same amount”?, and “Do you think there will be more, 
less, or about the same amount of racial prejudice in Britain in 5 years time compared with 
now?”. In Appendix Table A3 we present the estimated effects of UR on a binary variable 
indicating that the respondent believes there is less prejudice now than 5 years ago, and on a 
binary variable indicating that the respondent believes there will be less prejudice in 5 years 
time. The results show that an increase in UR significantly reduces the probability that the 
respondent believes there will be less prejudice in 5 years time: the estimated effect for the 
high-skilled subgroup defined above equals -0.016 (relative to a mean of 0.22). In other 
words, higher unemployment rates now lead people to expect more racial prejudice in the 
future.  
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4. Estimating Labour Market Discrimination over the Business Cycle 
 
The results in the previous section highlight that employed males aged 35-64 that are highly 
educated have the most pronounced counter-cyclical racial prejudice. Or at least, there are a 
larger proportion of intolerant high skill males in employment during recessions. Assuming 
these individuals are more likely to be managers, bosses and have political power within 
organisations, this may translate into worse labour market outcomes for non-Whites during 
periods of high unemployment. That is, if this is an increase in taste discrimination, high-
skilled White males may discriminate against non-Whites of all skill levels for whom they 
have any power over. However, if the increase in discrimination is a reaction to heightened 
job insecurity, the worsening will be concentrated among high skill job-seekers and workers 
(that is, people ‘like me’). In some sense this may be viewed as ‘rational’ discrimination, 
given that the propensity to discriminate arises from increased competition with those at their 
own skill level.  It follows, that if successful it results in the person’s own job and the jobs of 
their group members being more secure (Frijters, 1998). That is, there are economic gains to 
forming coalitions based on ethnicity. 
 
It is important to note that any racial labour market gaps that we can identify here could be 
counter-cyclical in the absence of counter-cyclical racial prejudice. An alternative 
explanation is that the costs of discriminatory behaviour could be lower during periods of 
high unemployment (Biddle and Hamermesh, 2013; Baert et al. 2013). Hiring a less qualified 
White applicant generates costs in terms of foregone production, and turning away a qualified 
non-White applicant generates additional search costs. During economic downturns there is a 
greater pool of White applicants to employ, and therefore employers with a taste for 
discrimination can more easily find qualified White workers. Thus, while the analysis that 
follows can inform on how racial labour market gaps vary with macroeconomic conditions, 
we cannot with certainty state that these changes are owed to increased racial prejudice.  
Nevertheless, given the results in Section 3, evidence that high skill non-Whites are 
especially affected during recessions would be highly suggestive that prejudice (and inter-
group competition) is an important pathway. Thus, what follows is arguably a powerful 
indirect test.  
 
4.1. Data 
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Our data source for measuring labour market discrimination is the 1993-2012 versions of the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). The QLFS is the main survey of individual 
economic activity in the UK, and provides the official measure of the national unemployment 
rate. We consider wage and employment differences between native Whites and native non-
Whites, and exclude all immigrants from the analysis. We make this selection decision 
because non-White immigrants have significantly lower observed and unobserved human 
capital than native Whites and non-Whites; they generally have lower levels of formal 
education, lack English language skills, are unfamiliar with local customs and work in 
unskilled jobs (Berthoud, 2000; Heath and Cheung, 2007). In addition, the composition of the 
immigrant work force is likely to change over the business cycle, with average immigrant 
human capital levels changing with the needs of the economy. This arises given that natives 
are likely to have more ties to their area of residence than non-natives. Individuals are 
identified as being native to the UK based on their country of birth and we include all 
respondents aged 18-64 years. We choose to focus on both employment and wages as it is 
plausible that there is heterogeneity in the results for these outcomes across worker groups. 
For example, the recession wage penalty (RWP) may be worse for highly educated non-
Whites whilst the recession employment penalty (REP) may be worse for non-Whites with 
low education levels. For the purpose of our analysis we generate quarterly unemployment 
rates specific to 19 geographic regions.18  
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
We now consider an indirect test to explore whether the increased prejudice described above 
may be affecting the labour market outcomes of non-Whites. Specifically, we test whether 
increases in	  the	  area-level UR increases racial employment and wage differentials, especially 
among those most in competition with high skilled White men. The test is based on estimates 
of a linear regression model with intercepts specific to each region of residence and quarter:   
 𝑦!"# = 𝛿𝑁𝑊!"# + 𝛾 𝑈𝑅!" ∙ 𝑁𝑊!"# + 𝑋!"#𝛽′+ 𝜇!" + 𝜀!"#   (2) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The geographic regions are: Tyne and Wear; Rest of North East, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Rest of 
North West, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands, West 
Midlands Metropolitan County, Rest of West Midlands, East of England, Inner London, Outer London, South 
East, South West, Wales, Strathclyde, and Rest of Scotland. 
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where 𝑦!"# is either log wages or employment of individual i residing in area a in quarter t, 𝑁𝑊!"# is a dummy variable indicating that individual i is non-White (disaggregated racial 
identifiers are used in some specifications), 𝑋!"# is a vector of individual-level control 
variables, 𝜇!" is an area-quarter fixed-effect, and 𝜀!"#    is a random disturbance term. Standard 
errors are clustered at the quarter-level (78 clusters), and are generally larger than standard 
errors obtained when clustering at the area-quarter level. For the wage regressions, the 
sample is restricted to those who are employed, and the wage variable is equal to the log of 
real gross weekly wages. Moreover, we include in all wage regressions nine dummy variables 
representing the first digit of standard occupation codes, along with nine interaction terms 
between the occupation dummies and the area-quarter unemployment rate. These occupation 
dummies control for the possibility that non-Whites more frequently work in occupations in 
which employment and wages are particularly responsive to economic conditions.  
 
Area-quarter intercepts (fixed-effects) are included in equation (2) to control for any 
differences in wages and employment across areas and time – this approach amounts to the 
inclusion of 1482 area-quarter dummy variables. This approach is feasible because the main 
variable of interest is the interaction term 𝑈𝑅!" ∙ 𝑁𝑊!"#, which varies across individuals 
within the same area-quarter. The large number of area-quarter terms does however rule out 
the use of a probit modelling approach for the employment outcome. Consequently, we use 
linear models for both employment and log wage outcomes. Note also that the pure 
unemployment rate effect on wages is not identified, as all individuals in the same area-
quarter face the same rate. We feel it is preferable to adequately control for differences in 
outcomes across areas and time, than to include a higher-level fixed-effect term (such as area-
level intercepts) and identify the pure unemployment rate effect.19  
 
A coefficient of interest in equation (2) is 𝛿, which provides a measure of the wage gap 
between Whites and non-Whites. Typically, the racial wage gap is negative, indicating that 
non-Whites earn less than Whites; though, given we have omitted all immigrants this may not 
hold true in our analysis. Importantly, the interaction term is constructed such that 𝛿 
represents the wage gap at mean levels of UR. Another coefficient of interest is 𝛾, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 We note that all conclusions are robust to relaxing this assumption, with the estimates from this preferred 
model being the most conservative. 
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we’ve labelled the RWP in the case of wages and the REP in the case of employment. In the 
case of wages, this term measures how the percentage difference in wages between native 
Whites and non-Whites (wage gap) changes with each 1%-point change in UR. A negative 
value of 𝛾 means an increase in UR worsens the wage gap between Whites and non-Whites, 
implying counter-cyclical discrimination. Conversely, a positive value of 𝛾 implies pro-
cyclical discrimination. In a similar vein, the REP measures how the percentage difference in 
the probability of being employed between native Whites and non-Whites (employment gap) 
changes with each 1%-point change in UR.20  
 
The vector of individual-level control variables (𝑋!"#) includes, age, age squared, education 
level (low, (control group), medium and high), marital status (single (control group), married, 
separated/divorced/widowed) and the number of children. For the wage regressions we also 
include usual hours worked and usual hours worked squared as additional controls. These 
covariates are included because there is a tendency for ethnic minorities to participate in part-
time work more frequently than Whites (Blackaby et al, 2002); though in practice they make 
little quantitative difference to the estimates of 𝛾. Similarly, our results are robust to the 
addition of fixed effects representing industry. 
 
4.3. Results 
 
Table 3 presents estimates of equation (2) for the employment and log wage outcomes, 
separately by males and females. 21  The four coefficients pertaining to the non-White 
indicator suggest that non-Whites have worse labour market outcomes than Whites overall. 
Specifically, non-White males are 13.5%-points less likely to be employed and their wages 
are 9.1% lower than White males (at mean levels of UR). Non-White females are 9.1%-
points less likely to be employed and their wages are 2.0% lower than White females. 
However, these estimated gaps must be interpreted with caution as they may not solely be 
caused by discrimination (taste-based or statistical), even when considering a sample of 
natives only. Alternative explanations are that non-Whites have lower levels of unobserved 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The potential mechanisms for REPs are increases in the likelihood of non-Whites getting fired and decreases 
in the likelihood of non-Whites getting hired. The potential mechanisms for RWPs are non-Whites’ 
disproportionally suffering pay cuts, lower starting wages when hired, and less frequent pay increases, bonuses 
and promotions. 
21 The estimated wage effects of our control variables are all consistent with previous studies. Age has a 
negative quadratic correlation, and education, marriage and children have a positive correlation. 
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human capital and that non-Whites are systematically willing to trade salary for non-
pecuniary compensation (due to differences in tastes or risk preferences).  
 
Coefficients on the non-White UR interaction term are also significantly negative. For males 
the employment gap and wage gap increase by 0.6%-points and 1.2% for a 1%-point increase 
in UR.22 For females, employment is not affected by UR, while the wage gap increases by 
1.1% for a 1%-point increase in UR. For a 4%-point increase in UR (as seen in the recent 
recession) these estimates imply that relative wages decrease by about 5% for both genders.23 
These estimates are less likely to suffer from omitted variable bias (composition effects) than 
the estimated average gaps, because unobserved human capital or preference differences 
between native Whites and non-Whites are unlikely to be associated with differences in area-
level unemployment rates.24 This contrasts with analogous immigration studies in which the 
systematic self-selection of immigrants into high wage areas is a genuine concern. An 
approach used in the immigration literature to mitigate the bias is to examine only the sub-
group of immigrants who have been living in the country for many years (e.g. Dustmann et 
al., 2010). This approach is based on the assumption that the current residential location of 
established immigrants is less likely to be based upon cyclical macroeconomic conditions. 
This is an assumption similar to our own, given that our analysis focuses exclusively on 
native ethnic minorities. Another approach is to examine more homogenous groups of 
employees. The idea is that the likelihood of omitted variable bias (unobserved human capital 
differences) is lessened if identification comes from comparisons between workers in similar 
age, education and occupation groups. We implement this approach below. 
 
Before presenting the subgroup analyses, we investigate the possibility that effects differ 
across regions and time according to the racial diversity of managers. Specifically, we 
construct, by area-year, a variable that equals the ratio of the proportion of managers who are 
White to the proportion of the population who are White (based on self-reports of managerial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The employment effects are not contingent on the inclusion of area-quarter fixed-effects. In models of 
employment with only area fixed-effects, the coefficient on the unemployment rate – non-white interaction term 
equals -0.005 (t-statistic = -5.07). The results are smaller but still statistically significant if no fixed-effects are 
included (coefficient estimate = -0.002; t-statistic = -1.91). 
23 Assuming there is negative selection out-of-employment (with respect to productivity and hence wages), the 
estimated increase in the wage gaps between Whites and non-Whites is an under-estimate of the counterfactual 
increase in the wage gap in the absence of selection out-of-employment. 
24 More specifically, our estimates would be partly driven by bias if non-White workers with high unobserved 
human capital systematically move to relatively low UR areas at higher rates than White workers and non-White 
workers with low unobserved human capital. 
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status). This variable, which ranges from 0.995 to 1.240, is then interacted with the main 
interaction term – UR · Non-White – and added to the baseline wage regression models.25 
The estimated coefficients on this new additional interaction term are significantly negative 
at the 5% level: male and female coefficients equal -0.059 and -0.069, respectively. These 
negative values indicate that the RWP for ethnic minorities is more highly cyclical in areas 
that have relatively high proportions of White managers. This result conforms to our 
hypothesis that an increase in prejudice among	   highly-educated middle-aged White men 
translates into worse labour market outcomes for non-Whites. 
 
Table 4 presents the results from a sub-group analysis for men (age, education and work 
hours). We focus on males given that the employment selection issues are far less 
problematic than for females. The results between genders are however generally 
consistent26. In Table 4 we report the coefficient on the non-White dummy variable that 
captures the racial wage/employment gap and the interaction term that captures the RWP or 
REP. The non-White dummy variable is negative and significant for all sub-groups in both 
the employment and wage models. For employment it is particularly large for the 18-34 age 
group (-0.157) and for the medium education group (-0.175). For wages it is particularly 
large for the 35-64 age group (-0.101), medium and high education groups (-0.083 and -
0.084) and for full-time workers (-0.089). More relevant are the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction term UR · Non-White. For both employment and wages, this interaction term is 
larger for older (-0.008 and -0.014) and highly educated individuals (-0.012 and -0.014). The 
difference between part-time and full-time workers is small and not statistically significant.  
 
Table 5 extends the sub-group analysis to occupation, sector and industry in order to consider 
heterogeneity in the effects.  Overall, we may expect the results to be strongest for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Given it is only possible to be a manager if employed, this constructed variable is endogenous to the racial 
gap in the probability of employment, and therefore was not additionally included in the employment 
regressions. 
26 Equivalent female results are included in Appendix Tables A4 and A5. Consistent with the results for males it 
is high-skilled non-manual, highly educated and manufacturing workers that have the highest RWPs. However, 
there are some differences to the male results. When we disaggregate our non-White indicator into Black, Asian 
and other ethnicity (see Table A.5) we observe that while the RWP is largest for high-skilled Black males, for 
females it is high-skilled Asians that have the largest RWP (-0.015 and -0.012 for Asian and Black females 
respectively). Similarly, among high skill non-manual workers, Asian females do worse than Black females (-
0.018 and -0.015 for Asian and Black females respectively). In contrast, for the REP Black females are the 
worst off in all the sub-groups we consider. Thus, it seems that Black females have a higher tendency to be fired 
and a lower tendency to be hired during recessions, rather than having lower wages conditional on employment.  
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manufacturing and administrative public services, which are the areas where entry is difficult 
in the short-run. Thus, there is an increased propensity for insider-outsider dynamics during a 
downturn as it is likely to reap rewards. Given that spending on education and health was not 
curtailed in the recessions that we analyse, we would expect lower effects in these industries. 
Additionally, we would expect lower effects for the unskilled whose jobs have lower barriers 
to entry and where racially based insider-behaviour is likely to be less effective.	  Overall, the 
results in Table 5 are in line with this intuition. Specifically, the estimated coefficients show 
that the interaction term UR · Non-White is largest for high-skilled non-manual workers (-
0.015), private sector workers (-0.014), and workers in the manufacturing (-0.020) and 
construction (-0.019) industries. Combined with the results in Table 4, these results suggest 
that it is high-skilled non-White workers – whether skill is defined by experience (proxied by 
age), education or occupation – in manufacturing and construction sectors that suffer most 
during recessions. If we re-estimate the models for the combined group – high-educated, 
high-skill non-manual workers in manufacturing and construction industries – the estimated 
RWP equals -0.033 (p-value <0.001). This estimate implies that for this sub-group, non-
White relative wages decrease by around 13% with a 4%-point increase in UR, as seen in the 
recent Great Recession.27 
 
In Tables 3-5 the unemployment rate is defined as the average rate of unemployment for all 
individuals residing in a particular area in a particular quarter. However, it is possible that the 
relevant measure for a subgroup is not the area-quarter average across all individuals, but the 
area-quarter average across only those individuals belonging to the subgroup (e.g. 
unemployment rate for highly educated men aged 35-64). This measure may more adequately 
capture labour market competition. Given sample size restrictions it isn’t possible to calculate 
highly individual-specific unemployment rates, but can we test this proposition by re-
estimating the models with education-area-quarter unemployment rates instead of area-
quarter unemployment rates. The results are mixed, with some UR · Non-White coefficient 
estimates larger than those presented and some smaller; though in all cases they remain 
statistically significant and the overall conclusions are the same. For example, in male log 
wage models the new estimate for: all men equals -0.005; highly-educated men equals -	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 As in the BSA prejudice analysis, results are generally stronger if we re-estimate models for sample years 
around the recent Great Recession. For example, using years 2005-2012, the estimated UR · Non-White 
coefficient from male log wage models equals -0.015 (t-stat = -3.96) for all male workers, -0.022 (t-stat = -2.88) 
for highly-educated workers, and -0.024 (t-stat = -4.10) for high skill non-manual workers. 
	   25	  
0.021; construction and manufacturing workers equals -0.008; and the combined high-skill 
group discussed directly above equals -0.069.  
 
We have chosen not to use education-area-quarter rates as our main measure as we don’t feel 
that it’s indisputably the ‘best’ measure to use. Theoretically, individuals should respond 
more strongly to the unemployment rate they personally face. But in reality, individuals 
respond only to perceived labour market competition, and individuals form perceptions based 
on readily available information, such as published region-specific unemployment rates, not 
largely unobservable individual-specific unemployment rates. More generally, there is a 
small economics literature that shows individuals are poor predictors of their ‘true’ labour 
market competition. For example, Kassenboehmer and Schatz (2014) show “that a substantial 
number of the currently unemployed consistently underestimate their re-employment 
probability and that our econometrician's model performs better on average at predicting re-
employment than the individuals stated expectations”. Another reason why we don’t use 
education-region-quarter rates as our main measure is that even with the large LFS sample, 
almost 10% of cells have fewer than 500 observations. Thus, the rates for many cells will 
contain substantial measurement error, leading to attenuation bias. 
 
Next we explore the potential for heterogeneity across the non-White sub-groups by 
disaggregating this broad classification into three groupings: Blacks, Asians (Indian, 
Pakistani or Bangladeshi) and other ethnicities (including Chinese).28 Practically, we replace 
the non-White dummy variable in equation (2) with dummy variables representing these 
three sub-groups. Similarly, we replace the interaction between non-Whites and UR with 
three interaction terms. The results are documented in Table 6 for our full sample as well as a 
sub-analysis for highly educated individuals,, workers in high-skill non-manual occupations 
and workers in manufacturing and construction industries. These subgroups were chosen 
because their estimated effects in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the effects for these groups are 
driving the full-sample effects in Table 3. The disaggregated results reveal that the effect of 
the unemployment rate (interaction terms) on employment and log wages is larger for Black 
men (-0.011 and -0.013) than for Asian men (-0.004 and -0.011) and other non-White men (-
0.003 and -0.007). The difference between the non-White sub-groups is particularly evident 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 We follow the common practice used in British surveys of labelling individuals from the Indian subcontinent 
countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as ‘Asian’, and treating these individuals separately to those from 
other countries in Asia (e.g. China). 
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in the sub-group wage analysis. The estimated coefficients on the UR · Black interaction 
terms for the high educated, high-skill non-manual, and manufacturing/construction 
subgroups equal -0.020, -0.024 and -0.023, respectively.  
 
5. Conclusions 	  
This paper investigates whether self-reported racial prejudice increases during economic 
downturns. There is ample anecdotal evidence that this is the case; but evidence based upon 
comprehensive statistical analysis is almost non-existent. By exploiting variation in 
unemployment rates across geographic regions and time, we find only small general 
population increases in prejudice during periods of high unemployment.  However, we find 
large increases for White males who are full-time employed, have high levels of education 
and are middle aged. The increase is especially large for the interaction of these groups; a 
1%-point increase in unemployment raises self-reported racial prejudice by 4%-points or 
10% relative to mean levels. The equivalent effect for females is also statistically significant, 
albeit half the size of the male effect. This set of results therefore corroborates the popular 
perception that racial prejudice does increase during recessions. Unfortunately, we do not 
have a time consistent racial identifier in the BSA with sufficient cell size to allow us to 
comment on whether racial attitudes changed for any non-White groups.  
 
The second half of the paper examines a potentially harmful consequence of this rise in 
racism. Given that there is a large increase in racial prejudice among highly-educated, 
middle-aged, full-time employed men, it may be expected that this would translate into worse 
labour market outcomes for all non-White workers regardless of their skill level.  This is 
classic ‘taste’ based discrimination. However, if the increase in discrimination is owed to 
heightened job insecurity the worsening will be concentrated among the highly skilled. This 
arises if the propensity to discriminate is the result of competition over scarce resources 
among job-seekers and workers with similar traits. Here, there are gains to forming coalitions 
based on ethnicity. Our empirical analysis of the LFS highlights that there are significant 
differences in employment and wages between Whites and non-Whites, and that these gaps 
increase with the unemployment rate. Specifically, we find the recession employment and 
wage penalties are the greatest for non-White workers with high skill levels, particularly for 
men working in manufacturing and construction industries. This suggests that the most likely 
mechanism is through the increased competition channel. For example, the estimated RWP 
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for high-educated, high-skill non-manual workers in manufacturing and construction 
industries equals 3.3%, implying that non-White relative wages decrease by around 13% with 
a 4%-point increase in UR, as seen in the recent Great Recession. Further analysis reveals 
that Black workers suffer larger RWPs than other non-White workers.  
 
Overall, the attitudes and labour market results support the hypothesis that racial prejudice is 
driven partly by increased labour market competition between racial groups during periods of 
high job uncertainty and scarcity.29 That is, the comparatively large effects for high-skill 
subgroups with respect to both self-reported racial prejudice and racial labour market gaps 
suggest that high-skill Whites may be utilising racial discrimination as a means to retain 
employment and achieve high wages. However, we are unable to conclusively exclude two 
alternative explanations. First, the costs of discriminatory behaviour could be lower during 
periods of high unemployment due to the greater pool of qualified White applicants to 
employ and promote. Second, the QLFS results could be driven by a converse process, in 
which affirmative action policies are promoted during economic expansions and abandoned 
during periods of economic recession. This is plausible if the distribution of unobserved 
productivity differs by race.  Both of these explanations imply that racial labour market gaps 
are counter-cyclical even in the absence of increased racial prejudice. Though possible, in 
light of our self-reported racial prejudice results, we believe these additional processes could 
only be partially responsible for our results. 
 
Regardless of the exact underlying processes, we find that during recessions there are 
relatively more White workers who report being racially prejudiced, and we find that during 
recessions existing racial inequalities in the labour market widen. The recent commentary in 
the popular press and the corresponding statements from equality and human rights groups 
appear correct. Given that non-Whites continue to experience significant inequalities in 
health, housing and schooling quality, we argue that policy makers must be mindful of how 
recessions can disproportionately penalise minority individuals, and should develop policies 
to avoid these harmful effects in the future. What these policies should be is not obvious 
given that currently the burden of proving discrimination is mostly on workers. We suggest 
that the government audit medium to large firms and publish the proportion of Non-Whites 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  These conclusions are robust to the consideration of a number of non-linear specifications, however this 
dynamic may be specific to the UK where ethnic minorities receive a similar number of third level 
qualifications in comparison to Whites.	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who are in senior roles. This may offer some safeguards for employees in companies that rely 
on public reputation.  Additionally, details of employment discrimination claims could be 
published annually with a right to reply by employers. 	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Figure 1: Self-Reported Racial Prejudice by Education, Gender and Employment Status 
 
Notes:  Based on the responses from White respondents who are in the working-age population (aged 
18-64) 
 
Figure 2: Self-Reported Racial Prejudice across Time by Gender 
  
Notes:  Based on the responses from White respondents who are in the working-age population (aged 
18-64) 
 
 
 
  
29 29
23
35 34
25
33
38
30
42 42
36
0
10
20
30
40
R
ac
ia
l p
re
ju
di
ce
 (%
)
Female Male
Not Working Working Not Working Working
Low educ Medium educ High educ
25
30
35
40
45
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
ra
ci
al
ly
 p
re
ju
di
ce
d
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Year
Female Male
	   36	  
Figure 3: Cross-Sectional Relationship between Regional Unemployment Rates and Self-
Reported Racial Prejudice 
 
Notes:  Based on the responses from White respondents who are in the working-age population (aged 
18-64) 
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Table 1: Linear Probability Models of Self-Reported Racial Prejudice by Gender 
 Males  Females 
 ME SE  ME SE 
Unemployment rate 0.010 (0.006)  0.004 (0.006) 
Age -0.010*** (0.003)  0.000 (0.002) 
Age squared / 100 0.011*** (0.003)  0.001 (0.003) 
Number of children -0.007 (0.005)  -0.014*** (0.004) 
Married 0.064*** (0.012)  0.006 (0.011) 
Separated or divorced 0.028* (0.015)  0.004 (0.013) 
Widowed 0.023 (0.032)  -0.026 (0.020) 
Full-time employment 0.044*** (0.016)  0.030*** (0.009) 
Part-time employment -0.002 (0.025)  0.031*** (0.010) 
Unemployed 0.016 (0.022)  0.019 (0.015) 
Retired -0.014 (0.022)  0.016 (0.016) 
Full-time student -0.060** (0.030)  -0.054*** (0.020) 
Education medium 0.015 (0.011)  0.012 (0.009) 
Education high -0.037*** (0.013)  -0.061*** (0.011) 
Log income 0.167*** (0.036)  0.073** (0.030) 
Log income squared -0.033*** (0.007)  -0.011* (0.006) 
No party allegiance -0.031** (0.015)  -0.038*** (0.013) 
Labour voter -0.108*** (0.010)  -0.094*** (0.010) 
Alliance voter -0.105*** (0.013)  -0.085*** (0.012) 
Other party voter  0.072** (0.031)  -0.014 (0.025) 
Mean outcome 0.375   0.289  
R-squared 0.041   0.039  
Sample size 14150   17232  
Note: Figures are OLS coefficient estimates based on the responses from White 
individuals only aged 18-64. Dependent variable equals one if a little prejudiced or 
very prejudiced, and zero otherwise. Included in the model but not shown are area-
level fixed-effects, area-level linear time trends, and year fixed-effects. Standard 
errors clustered at the area-year level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 2: Estimated Effects of the Unemployment Rate on Self-Reported Racial Prejudice by 
Subgroups 
 Males   Females  
 ME SE  ME SE 
Age      
(1) 18-34 -0.007 (0.011)  0.007 (0.008) 
(2) 35-64 0.017*** (0.006)  0.003 (0.007) 
Education      
(3) Low (no qualifications) -0.004 (0.014)  -0.006 (0.009) 
(4) Medium (CSE / o-levels) 0.018 (0.011)  -0.000 (0.010) 
(5) High (a-levels / degree) 0.015** (0.007)  0.015* (0.008) 
Employment      
(6) Full-time 0.018*** (0.007)  0.011 (0.008) 
(7) Full-time or part-time 0.014** (0.007)  0.010 (0.007) 
(8) Not employed 0.002 (0.012)  -0.005 (0.009) 
Interactions      
(9) 35-64 + high educ 0.029*** (0.010)  0.014 (0.009) 
(10) 35-64 + full-time emp 0.027*** (0.007)  0.011 (0.010) 
(11) high educ + full-time emp 0.020** (0.009)  0.014 (0.011) 
(12) 35-64 + high educ + full-time emp 0.039*** (0.010)  0.022* (0.012) 
Note: Figures are OLS unemployment rate coefficient estimates based on the responses from 
White individuals only aged 18-64. Dependent variable equals one if a little prejudiced or very 
prejudiced, and zero otherwise. Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression model. Included 
in all models are the covariates shown in Table 1, area-level fixed-effects, area-level linear time 
trends, and year fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at the area-year level are shown in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 3: Employment and Log Wage Regression Models using Data from Labour Force 
Survey 
 Males  Females 
 Employed Log Wage  Employed Log Wage 
Non-White -0.135*** -0.091***  -0.091*** -0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.005) 
UR · Non-White -0.006*** -0.012***  0.001 -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Age 0.051*** 0.067***  0.046*** 0.041*** 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Education medium 0.118*** 0.133***  0.151*** 0.107*** 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Education high 0.166*** 0.328***  0.240*** 0.307*** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Married 0.152*** 0.110***  0.053*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Separated / divorced 0.010*** 0.056***  0.006*** -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Number of children -0.026*** 0.012***  -0.098*** -0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Occupation controls O P  O P 
Work hours controls O P  O P 
Sample size 2234822 435777  2633749 463505 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients from linear regression models with 1482 quarter-
region fixed-effects. The sample is restricted to native individuals only. Occupation 
controls are 9 dummy variables denoting occupation categories and 9 interactions 
between the occupation dummies and the unemployment rate. Work hours controls are 
work hours and work hours squared. Standard errors clustered at the quarter level are 
shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Employment and Log Wage Models for Males by Age, Education and Work hours 
 Employed  Log Wage 
 Non-White UR · Non-White  Non-White UR · Non-White 
Age          
(1) 18-34 -0.157*** (0.003) -0.003*** (0.001)  -0.091*** (0.006) -0.011*** (0.002) 
(2) 35-64 -0.069*** (0.004) -0.008*** (0.001)  -0.101*** (0.011) -0.014*** (0.004) 
Education          
(3) Low -0.127*** (0.007) -0.004** (0.002)  -0.069*** (0.013) -0.005 (0.005) 
(4) Medium  -0.175*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001)  -0.083*** (0.007) -0.011*** (0.003) 
(5) High -0.070*** (0.003) -0.012*** (0.001)  -0.084*** (0.009) -0.014*** (0.003) 
Work hours          
(6) Part-time -  -   -0.046*** (0.014) -0.013** (0.005) 
(7) Full-time -  -   -0.089*** (0.005) -0.010*** (0.002) 
Note: Each coefficient represents a coefficient estimate from an individual regression that differs by the dependent variable 
and the sub sample being considered. Figures are estimated coefficients on a non-White dummy variable and on the 
interaction term UR·Non-White from linear regression models with 1482 quarter-region fixed-effects. The sample is 
restricted to native individuals only. Also included but not shown are covariates representing age, educational attainment, 
marital status and children. Occupation and work hours controls are also included in the log wage regressions. Standard 
errors clustered at the quarter level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Log Wage Models for Males by Occupation, Sector and Industry 
 Non-White UR · Non-White 
Occupation     
(1) All manual -0.059*** (0.010) -0.004 (0.004) 
(2) Low skill non-manual -0.091*** (0.010) -0.007** (0.003) 
(3) High skill non-manual -0.097*** (0.008) -0.015*** (0.003) 
Sector      
(4) Private -0.096*** (0.006) -0.014*** (0.003) 
(5) Public -0.071*** (0.009) -0.006 (0.005) 
Industry     
(5) Manufacturing -0.079*** (0.013) -0.020*** (0.006) 
(6) Construction -0.077*** (0.027) -0.019* (0.011) 
(7) Hotels & restaurants -0.077*** (0.012) -0.014*** (0.004) 
(8) Transport & communication -0.071*** (0.016) -0.001 (0.006) 
(9) Banking & finance -0.121*** (0.013) -0.009 (0.006) 
(10) Public admin & social security -0.115*** (0.017) -0.006 (0.006) 
(11) Education -0.034 (0.020) -0.010 (0.009) 
(12) Health & social work -0.031* (0.019) -0.010 (0.007) 
Note: Each coefficient represents a coefficient estimate from an individual regression that 
differs by the sub sample being considered. Figures are estimated coefficients on a non-
White dummy variable and on the interaction term UR·Non-White from linear regression 
models with 1482 quarter-region fixed-effects. The sample is restricted to native 
individuals only.Also included but not shown are covariates representing age, educational 
attainment, marital status, children, occupation and work hours. Standard errors clustered 
at the quarter level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Disaggregated Racial Employment and Wage Gaps for Males 
 Employed  Log Wage 
 
All 
High 
Education  All 
High 
Education 
High skill 
Non-manual 
Manufacturing 
& Construction 
Black -0.111*** -0.080***  -0.103*** -0.143*** -0.150*** -0.084*** 
 (0.004) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) 
Asian -0.150*** -0.064***  -0.085*** -0.059*** -0.064*** -0.078*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) 
Other ethnicity -0.133*** -0.072***  -0.086*** -0.073*** -0.088*** -0.075** 
 (0.005) (0.008)  (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) 
UR · Black -0.011*** -0.013***  -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.024*** -0.023*** 
 (0.001) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
UR · Asian -0.004*** -0.012***  -0.011*** -0.009* -0.010* -0.017** 
 (0.001) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
UR · Other -0.003* -0.009***  -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Sample size 2234822 557991  435777 131904 196791 141231 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients from linear regression models with 1482 time-region fixed-effects.  The sample 
is restricted to native individuals only. Also included but not shown are covariates representing age, educational 
attainment, marital status and children. Occupation and work hours controls are also included in the log wage regressions. 
Standard errors clustered at the quarter level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Appendix Table A1: Description of Covariates Used in Analyses of Self-Reported Racial 
Prejudice 
Variable 
Full 
Sample 
 Not 
Prejudiced 
Little / very 
Prejudiced 
Male 0.451  0.419 0.516 
Age 41.62  41.34 42.18 
Age squared / 100 19.03  18.79 19.52 
Number of children 0.674  0.691 0.640 
Married 0.639  0.622 0.674 
Separated or divorced 0.126  0.131 0.114 
Widowed 0.033  0.035 0.030 
Full-time employment 0.532  0.510 0.578 
Part-time employment 0.128  0.131 0.120 
Unemployed 0.061  0.062 0.059 
Retired 0.068  0.067 0.069 
Full-time student 0.023  0.028 0.015 
Education medium 0.308  0.295 0.333 
Education high 0.419  0.437 0.382 
Log income 2.678  2.662 2.709 
Log income squared 7.699  7.646 7.806 
No party allegiance 0.118  0.117 0.119 
Labour voter 0.326  0.351 0.275 
Alliance voter 0.119  0.125 0.107 
Other party voter  0.028  0.027 0.031 
Sample size 31382  21092 10290 
Note: All figures are sample means from White respondents only aged 18-64. 
The omitted (baseline) dummy variables are: never married; looking after the 
home; no educational qualification; Conservative party preference.  
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Appendix Table A2: Non-Linear and Dynamic Specifications for Middle Aged, Highly 
Educated, Full-Time Employed Samples 
 
All 
Females 
(1) 
All Males 
(2) 
Males 
Aged 
35-64 
(3) 
Males 
with High 
Education 
(4) 
Males 
Full-time 
Employed 
(5) 
Interaction 
of Groups 
(3)-(5) 
(6) 
(A) Nonlinear       5 < 𝑈𝑅! ≤ 8  0.005 0.034** 0.027 0.017 0.054*** 0.031 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.037) 8 < 𝑈𝑅! ≤ 11 0.010 0.037 0.035 0.014 0.079** 0.080 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.036) (0.014) (0.030) (0.049) 11 < 𝑈𝑅!  0.058** 0.053 0.054 0.057 0.101* 0.169** 
 (0.024) (0.038) (0.050) (0.032) (0.046) (0.066) 
(B) Dynamic       𝑈𝑅!  0.001 0.009* 0.011 0.021*** 0.019** 0.040* 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.019) 𝑈𝑅!!!  0.004 0.003 0.012* -0.012 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.018) 𝑈𝑅!!!  0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) 
       
(C) Averaged       Σ!!!! 𝑈𝑅!!! 3  0.008 0.009* 0.021*** 0.008 0.017 0.043** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) 
       
Sample size 22066 17641 9245 7346 10433 3352 
Note: Estimates are from linear probability regression models and the sample is White respondents only aged 
18-64.  Figures are regression coefficient estimates for the unemployment rate. Dependent variable equals 
one if a little prejudiced or very prejudiced, and zero otherwise. Included in all models are the covariates 
shown in Table 1, area-level fixed-effects, area-level linear time trends, and year fixed-effects. Standard 
errors clustered at the area-year level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Appendix Table A3: OLS estimates of the Unemployment Rate on Relative Prejudice Rates 
 
All 
Females 
(1) 
All Males 
(2) 
Males 
Aged 
35-64 
(3) 
Males 
with High 
Education 
(4) 
Males 
Full-time 
Employed 
(5) 
Interaction 
of Groups 
(3)-(5) 
(6) 
(A) Less racial prejudice now compared to 5 years ago 
 0.002 -0.007 -0.018* -0.002 -0.009 -0.016 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.013) 
       
(B) Less racial prejudice in 5 years compared to now 
 0.002 -0.006 -0.016*** -0.002 -0.012* -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
       
Sample size 16588 13697 8951 6413 10056 3267 
Note: Estimates are from linear probability regression models and the sample is White respondents 
only aged 18-64.  Figures are regression coefficient estimates for the unemployment rate. Dependent 
variable equals one if the respondent agrees with the statement and zero otherwise. Included in all 
models are the covariates shown in Table 1, area-level fixed-effects, area-level linear time trends, 
and year fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at the area-year level are shown in parentheses. *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Appendix Table A4: Log Wage Models for Females by Subgroups 
 Non-White UR · Non-White 
Age     
18-34 -0.024*** (0.005) -0.009*** (0.002) 
35-64 -0.013 (0.008) -0.014*** (0.003) 
Education     
Low 0.023* (0.013) -0.004 (0.005) 
Medium  0.004 (0.006) -0.011*** (0.003) 
High -0.036*** (0.008) -0.013*** (0.003) 
Work hours     
Part-time -0.008 (0.006) -0.008** (0.003) 
Full-time -0.036*** (0.006) -0.011*** (0.002) 
Occupation     
All manual 0.023* (0.013) -0.002 (0.007) 
Low skill non-manual 0.007 (0.005) -0.008*** (0.002) 
High skill non-manual -0.041*** (0.008) -0.017*** (0.003) 
Sector      
Private -0.034*** (0.006) -0.014*** (0.002) 
Public -0.001 (0.007) -0.010*** (0.003) 
Industry     
Manufacturing -0.042*** (0.015) -0.021** (0.008) 
Construction 0.028 (0.049) -0.008 (0.020) 
Hotels & restaurants -0.033*** (0.010) -0.012*** (0.004) 
Transport & communication -0.038* (0.019) -0.012 (0.011) 
Banking & finance -0.065*** (0.011) -0.008* (0.004) 
Public admin & social security -0.056*** (0.012) -0.013** (0.006) 
Education 0.012 (0.014) -0.007 (0.005) 
Health & social work 0.003 (0.011) -0.008** (0.004) 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients on a non-White dummy variable and on the 
interaction term UR·Non-White from linear regression models with 1482 quarter-region 
fixed-effects. The sample is restricted to native individuals only. Also included but not 
shown are covariates representing age, educational attainment, marital status, children, 
occupation and work hours. Standard errors clustered at the quarter level are shown in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
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Appendix Table A5: Disaggregated Racial Employment and Wage Gaps for Females 
 Employed  Log Wage 
 
All 
High 
Education  All 
High 
Education 
High skill 
Non-manual Manufacturing  
Black -0.039*** -0.035***  -0.008 -0.064*** -0.068*** -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.028) 
Asian -0.124*** -0.073***  -0.031*** -0.020** -0.031*** -0.069*** 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.025) 
Other ethnicity -0.095*** -0.057***  -0.013 -0.025 -0.014 -0.056 
 (0.006) (0.010)  (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.035) 
UR · Black -0.005*** -0.008***  -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.010 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) 
UR · Asian 0.005*** -0.003*  -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.019* 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) 
UR · Other -0.002 -0.001  -0.015*** -0.004 -0.015** -0.060*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) 
Sample size 2633749 587316  463505 138980 162634 39529 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients from linear regression models with 1482 time-region fixed-effects. The sample is 
restricted to native individuals only. Also included but not shown are covariates representing age, educational attainment, 
marital status and children. Occupation and work hours controls are also included in the log wage regressions. Standard 
errors clustered at the quarter level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 	  
 
 
 
